The author deals with the meaning of metamerism. Two contrary points of view may serve to clear the problem. From the morphological point of view probably outgrowth of the organism in longitudinal direction has led to the development of metameres. So the first segmentation is due to a functional differentiation. In Phylogeny this segmentation has been maintained and the originally developed metameres remain the primary morphotic units of the organisms. Further specialising of function and organ-concentration destroyed the original absolute metamerism (...) and only left a rest of the original.The functional point of view renounces an original absolute metamerism for the present moment. It only asks for the functional meaning of the segmentation in organisms, showing this segmentation. From the functional point of view it is possible that metamerism may be the morphological expression of quite different functional requirements and that in one organism the metamerism starts from another system of organs than in another.Es wird gefragt welche Bedeutung die Metamerie haben kann. Zur Erläuterung des Problems werden zwei extremen Betrachtungsweisen einander gegenübergestellt. Nach der morphologischen Betrachtungsweise hat Wachstum der Organismen in die Länge wahrscheinlich zur Ausbildung der Metamerie geführt. Diese erste Metamerie ist wahrscheinlich ein funktioneller Differenzierungsprozess gewesen.In der Phylogenese hat sich diese Metamerie behauptet und die ursprünglich entstandene Metamere sind die primären morphotischen Einheiten der Organismen geblieben. Weitergehende Funktionsspezialisierung und Organkonzentration hat die ursprüngliche absolute Metamerie vernichtet. Was davon übrig blieb sind die Reste der ursprünglichen.Die funktioneile Betrachtungsweise verzichtet vorläufig auf eine ursprüngliche absolute Metamerie. Sie fragt bloss nach der funktionellen Bedeutung, welche die Metamerie besitzt bei denjenigen Organismen, wo diese gefunden wird. Sie achtet es möglich, dass Metamerie der Ausdruck sein kann von ganz verschiedenen funktionellen Anforderungen und dass somit die Metamerie bei der einen Tiergruppe von einem ganz anderen Organsystem ausgeht wei bei einer anderen. (shrink)

Aworkshop was held August 26–28, 2015, by the Earth- Life Science Institute (ELSI) Origins Network (EON, see Appendix I) at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. This meeting gathered a diverse group of around 40 scholars researching the origins of life (OoL) from various perspectives with the intent to find common ground, identify key questions and investigations for progress, and guide EON by suggesting a roadmap of activities. Specific challenges that the attendees were encouraged to address included the following: What key (...) questions, ideas, and investigations should the OoL research community address in the near and long term? How can this community better organize itself and prioritize its efforts? What roles can particular subfields play, and what can ELSI and EON do to facilitate research progress? (See also Appendix II.) The present document is a product of that workshop; a white paper that serves as a record of the discussion that took place and a guide and stimulus to the solution of the most urgent and important issues in the study of the OoL. This paper is not intended to be comprehensive or a balanced representation of the opinions of the entire OoL research community. It is intended to present a number of important position statements that contain many aspirational goals and suggestions as to how progress can be made in understanding the OoL. The key role played in the field by current societies and recurring meetings over the past many decades is fully acknowledged, including the International Society for the Study of the Origin of Life (ISSOL) and its official journal Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres, as well as the International Society for Artificial Life (ISAL). (shrink)

I want to discuss a view of punishment which stresses its ‘expressive’ character and seeks in that its justification. While I shall label this view ‘expressionism’, I should warn that most theorists who express an ‘expressionist’ view do not present it as an exhaustive account, but rather claim to be highlighting an aspect that tends to be neglected within the rationalist framework common to retributivism and utilitarianism. Among contemporary writings I shall focus on Joel Feinberg's article, ‘The Expressive Function of (...) Punishment’ in The Monist 49, No. 4 . While I accept that ‘expression’ usefully sums up much of what underlies punitive practices, I shall urge that the term conceals a variety of more or less amalgamated ingredients which need to be disentangled for critical inspection. I shall argue that under those aspects, punishment's justification continues to be elusive. I do not imagine that these arguments will deter my more punitive colleagues from continuing to seek such justification, but I hope they will search elsewhere. Feinberg writes: Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, either on the part of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted. Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties. (shrink)

Recent policy in relation to clinical research proposals in the UK has distinguished between two types of review: scientific and ethical. This distinction has been formally enshrined in the recent changes to research ethics committee structure and operating procedures, introduced as the UK response to the EU Directive on clinical trials. Recent reviews and recommendations have confirmed the place of the distinction and the separate review processes. However, serious reservations can be mounted about the science/ethics distinction and the policy of (...) separate review that has been built upon it. We argue here that, first, the science/ethics distinction is incoherent, and, second, that RECs should not only be permitted to consider a study’s science, but that they have anobligation do so. (shrink)

What follows is a discussion, in three parts, of the African concept of ubuntu and related issues. In the first part of the discussion J.A.I. Bewaji assesses an essay by W.M.J. van Binsbergen on Ubuntu and the Globalisation of Southern African Thought and Society (2001). In the second part Bewaji reviews M.B. Ramose's African Philosophy through Ubuntu (2002). And in the third part Ramose responds to both Bewaji and Van Binsbergen. Although Ramose disagrees with some of Bewaji's comments and interpretations (...) – especially with regard to the thesis on which ubuntu is, according to the former, founded (i.e. “that ontology proper is a rheology”) – both Bewaji and Ramose agree that Van Binsbergen's critique of ubuntu philosophy, and specifically of Ramose's explication thereof, is untenable. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.22(4) 2003: 378-414. (shrink)

The issue of directed donation of organs from deceased donors for transplantation has recently risen to the fore, given greater significance by the relatively stagnant rate of deceased donor donation in the UK. Although its status and legitimacy is explicitly recognized across the USA, elsewhere a more cautious, if not entirely negative, stance has been taken. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Human Tissue Act 2004, and in Scotland the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, are both silent in this (...) regard. Although so-called conditional donation, donation to (or perhaps withheld from) a specific class, has been outlawed as a product of guidance issued by the Secretary of State for Health issued in the wake of the controversial incident occurring in the North of England in 1998, its intended application to ‘directed’ donation is less certain. Directed and conditional donations challenge the traditional construct of altruistic donation and impartial (equitable) allocation in a very immediate and striking fashion. They implicitly raise important questions as to whether the body or parts of the body are capable of being owned, and by whom. This paper attempts to explore the notion of donor ownership of body parts and its implications for both directed and conditional donation. (shrink)

I aim to show how and why some definitions can be benignly circular. According to Lloyd Humberstone, a definition that is analytically circular need not be inferentially circular and so might serve to illuminate the application-conditions for a concept. I begin by tidying up some problems with Humberstone's account. I then show that circular definitions of a kind commonly thought to be benign have inferentially circular truth-conditions and so are malign by Humberstone's test. But his test is too demanding. The (...) inferences we actually use to establish the applicability of, e.g., colour concepts are designed to establish warranted assertability and not truth. Understood thus, dispositional analyses are not inferentially circular. (shrink)

A number of recent papers have described the successful derivation of egg and sperm precursor cells from mouse embryonic stem cells—so-called “artificial” gametes. Although many scientific questions remain, this research suggests numerous new possibilities for stem cell research and assisted reproductive technology, if a similar breakthrough is achieved with human embryonic stem cells. The novel opportunities raised by artificial gametes also prompt new ethical questions, such as whether same-sex couples should be able to access this technology to have children who (...) are genetically related to them both.THE CREATION OF “ARTIFICIAL” GAMETESOver the past two years, a number of papers have been published detailing the first successful attempts at differentiating mouse embryonic stem cells into egg1 and sperm2 precursor cells. Previously, researchers had used embryonic stem cells to generate tissues such as brain, liver, and pancreatic cells, but not germ cells of any kind. Production of gamete precursor cells was achieved initially through allowing stem cell lines to differentiate more or less randomly, but recent research has focused on identifying the precise ways in which differentiation into gametes can be precipitated and controlled. These breakthroughs make it seem likely that ongoing research on human stem cells will yield similar possibilities,3 raising questions over the practicalities of what might be achieved with such “artificial” gametes. In turn, the novel opportunities presented by artificial gametes raise a number of ethical concerns.The initial breakthrough, namely the obtaining of egg cells from mouse stem cells, was achieved by means of relatively simple science. Rather than coaxing stem cells to develop into eggs using complicated cocktails of growth factors, researchers adopted standard cell culture conditions, but grew the cells at higher density than usual.3–6 Growing the cells in this way led to the formation of ovary-like cell aggregates, which (when separated and stimulated with …. (shrink)

We prove that compactness is equivalent to the amalgamation property, provided the occurrence number of the logic is smaller than the first uncountable measurable cardinal. We also relate compactness to the existence of certain regular ultrafilters related to the logic and develop a general theory of compactness and its consequences. We also prove some combinatorial results of independent interest.

Living-donor kidney transplantation is the “gold standard” treatment for many individuals with end-stage renal failure. Superior outcomes for the graft and the transplant recipient have prompted the implementation of new strategies promoting living-donor kidney transplantation, and the number of such transplants has increased considerably over recent years. Living donors are undoubtedly exposed to risk. In his editorial “underestimating the risk in living kidney donation”, Walter Glannon suggests that more data on long-term outcomes for living donors are needed to determine whether (...) this risk is permissible and the extent to which physicians and transplant surgeons should promote living-donor kidney transplantation.1 In this paper I argue that it is not clear that medical professionals have underestimated this risk, nor is it clear that more data on long-term outcomes are needed in order to determine whether it is permissible for individual autonomous agents to expose themselves to this or, indeed, any risk. The global shortage of organs available for transplantation ultimately means that every year thousands of individuals who value their life die needlessly. This is an unacceptable loss of human life. Saving life is one of the most wonderful things an individual can do for another. Promoting any strategy that will assist in saving life and preventing human suffering within acceptable moral limits is legitimate. (shrink)

In the literature the term “natural balance” occurs frequently and is used for highly divergent collections of facts and for results arrived at by different methods. In this paper it is attempted to give a review of the many possible meanings of “balance in nature”, and to evaluate the application of the term in the scientific literature.To achieve this twofold objective it seemed useful to start by giving as objective as possible a description of the “balance situation” in natural communities, (...) in analogy with the original physical concept and according to strict scientific criteria. On the basis of this working standard, part of the ecological literature is discussed with respect to statements and presumptions concerning “balance”. The extensive literature is classified according to several groups, on the one hand on the basis of the nature of the views , on the other hand according to the importance that certain authors attach to the theory of a given author. For each of these groups, an evaluation of the content of the term “balance” is given. It was found that the reasoning is not always sound and that the nature of the data on which the concept is based varies widely, which also holds for the method of reasoning applied in the conclusions drawn. In none of the publications arguments were found supporting the existence of a natural “balance situation” as formulated in the standard description. Consequently, it seemed justified to conclude that it is not correct to apply a concept “natural balance”, defined purely scientifically, to natural situations, either because “balance” in the indicated sense is simply not present or because the situation under consideration is not a natural one . The concept “natural balance” has had only heuristic value for scientific research. In other contexts it has a different value, because there criteria other than scientific or methodological ones hold for the content of a concept. It is therefore not objectionable to use the term “natural balance” in common parlance, especially since this usage makes it possible to convey to the layman a great deal in few words. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Bridge From Analysis to Action:Psychodynamic Analyses of Religion and Michael S. Hogue's American ImmanenceAJ Turner (bio)I. IntroductionThe purpose of this essay is to work constructively with Michael S. Hogue's groundbreaking American Immanence: Democracy for an Uncertain World to demonstrate how psychodynamic analyses of religion are essential theoretical allies in the fight for resilient democracy. The "revolution in mind"1 that psychodynamic approaches contribute, especially in their analyses of religion, (...) both complements and complicates socio-political theory as a whole. In the improvisational spirit of "yes-and," the goal here is not to identify and decry the failures and shortcomings of Hogue's theopolitical vision but rather to inspire the recovery of a sibling discourse—a kind of "rebirth of a forgotten alternative"2—that also draws deeply from the American immanental tradition in order to add psychodynamic depth to Hogue's timely and important analysis. Psychodynamic theories of religion shed light on how symbolic identifications, including and especially ultimate concerns, structure personal and collective experience. By engaging religion and theology sympathetically, constructively, and creatively, theorists such as Rollo May, Gordon Allport, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Ernest Becker departed from the skepticism, reductionism, and dismissal that characterized psychoanalytic analyses of religion in the wake of Freud.3 Each of these figures, and especially Becker whose work will be a focus in this essay, are noteworthy interlocutors for extending Hogue's theopolitical theorizing of resilient democracy, particularly in how they drew unique inspiration from the American immanental tradition [End Page 44] in their social analyses. In this respect, they provide a more robust theorization of the psychosocial conditions of the associational ethos needed to connect Hogue's conception of resilient democracy with forms of agonistic organization and democratic activism. Briefly stated, psychodynamic approaches are a helpful bridge for connecting these proposals to strategies of organization, their impediments, and collective action.In this way, both psychodynamic analyses of religion and Hogue's theopolitical innovation insist that no revolutionary political change is possible, and certainly not of the kind or scale needed to counter our wickedly entangled global crises, without a deep engagement with theological imaginaries. They differ, however, in their theoretical aims. Whereas Hogue compellingly argues for the political upshot of a theology deriving from the American immanental tradition, psychodynamic analysts of religion focus on the function of ultimate concerns in individual and collective life. In other words, American Immanence rests on a methodology of analyzing the philosophical and theological assumptions that have contributed to our climate crises and then presenting clear and compelling articulation of an alternative paradigm meant to open up new ways of being. In contrast psychodynamic analyses leverage conceptual clarity of psychic reality for the fundamentally therapeutic aim of transformation. At their best, both approaches share what could be called an etiological orientation to ontological questions in order to provide liberative alternatives through rational understanding and clarification, but the terrain, and thus the problems they hope to mitigate in their analyses are focused differently. Extending the visual metaphor, they are different lenses highlighting different areas of the same landscape. Furthermore, it must be said that neither are sufficient in themselves, but the psychodynamic theorists of religion to be highlighted in this essay share deeply with Hogue's heading in American Immanence.II. A Problematic AssumptionIn emphasizing and attempting to explain4 the role of non-rational processes in the both individual and social processes of perception and organization of experience, psychodynamic theories confound a widely held and problematic assumption that the triumph of rational analysis is the hallmark for building the society to which we should aspire. Political theory in general, [End Page 45] especially as it has taken its cues from a rationalist legacy about the inherently liberating force of Reason, has been weighted toward an assumption that its task of exposing the mystifications of power would suffice in inspiring more "rational" and therefore necessarily equitable social organization. This speaks to the longstanding socio-political interest in "consciousness raising" tactics, which are often meant to dispel "false consciousness." It even comes across in the emphases of Deweyan pragmatists on education. Psychologists of all stripes point out that this approach... (shrink)

Guest Editors' introductionFor this special issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics we have assembled articles that reflect some of the newer issues or fresh perspectives. There is a mix of approaches including forward looks, present dilemmas and reflections on the past, now that sufficient time has elapsed to allow a considered view. We are most grateful to our wide range of contributors for their thoughtful analyses of several key areas of contemporary debate. Our own contributions include the following editorials (...) in which each of us has considered, from his own perspective, the impact of AIDS on medical ethics, a case study and a lexicon that allows brief probing of some topics.The impact of aids on medical ethics -1ANTHONY J PINCHINGMedical ethics has been matured through being tested and refined through the multifaceted challenge of AIDS. As with the society and social values from which its moral framework is derived, so medical ethics has been subjected to intense scrutiny by the emergence of this new disease. Few areas of ethical discourse have been untouched. This infection is so intensely private in its transmission, the disease so isolating and so personally devastating in its impact, it readily distinguishes the reality of what people are and do, from the rhetoric of what others may feel they should be and do. AIDS has forced us to recognise that respecting individual rights is a critical safeguard for the health of the community, as well as for the person. These issues are well illustrated by the interweaving issues of patient empowerment, respect for confidentiality, and patient advocacy and activism.EMPOWERMENTPhysicians in this field have been struck by the way in which people affected have wanted to be involved in decision making. While this has often been ascribed to their social groups, it probably was more a reflection of their younger age and a generation change …. (shrink)

For the sentences of languages that contain operators that express the concepts of definiteness and indefiniteness, there is an unavoidable tension between a truth-theoretic semantics that delivers truth conditions for those sentences that capture their propositional contents and any model-theoretic semantics that has a story to tell about how indetifiniteness in a constituent affects the semantic value of sentences which imbed it. But semantic theories of both kinds play essential roles, so the tension needs to be resolved. I argue that (...) it is the truth theory which correctly characterises the notion of truth, per se. When we take into account the considerations required to bring model theory into harmony with truth theory, those considerations undermine the arguments standardly used to motivate supervaluational model theories designed to validate classical logic. But those considerations also show that celebration would be premature for advocates of the most frequently encountered rival approach - many-valued model theory. (shrink)

Routine management of geriatric problems often raises ethical problems, particularly regarding autonomy of the old person. The carers or children may be unaware of the sensitivity of role reversal in dealing with the financial affairs; the need for a residential carer may compromise the old person’s privacy. Attending a day centre confers much benefit, but one must understand the old person’s resistance to change in the proposal of a new daily regimen. Similarly his or her autonomy must be the priority (...) in planning for admittance to an old age home, and not the assumption that the family knows best. A common dilemma is the assessment of an old person’s competency in decision making, either about management of his affairs, or regarding consent to treatment, or participation in research. Because cognitive capacity is not always identical with competency, meaningful tools have recently been developed in which the emphasis is on the specific situation to be investigated. (shrink)

The author contends that the analogies between "the logical roles of singular and universal statements" are important but do not "justify the conclusion that singular statements are reducible to propositions" of the forms a, E, I, And o. (staff).

In his recent paper Gellner singles me out for special comment and some reply is called for. He attributes to me several propositions which he says I made in my note on ‘Physical and social kinship’ in this journal, and he then refutes them. Reading his paper I cannot avoid thinking that he exaggerates the differences between us, thereby apparently strengthening his argument. Some substantial differences there are, but others are fictional. A line-by-line analysis of what he says about me (...) in his paper might be amusing but would be of only ephemeral interest. In this reply I confine myself to a few important issues. (shrink)

There is as yet no settled consensus as to what makes a term a logical constant or even as to which terms should be recognized as having this status. This essay sets out and defends a rationale for identifying logical constants. I argue for a two-tiered approach to logical theory. First, a secure, core logical theory recognizes only a minimal set of constants needed for deductively systematizing scientific theories. Second, there are extended logical theories whose objectives are to systematize various (...) pre-theoretic, modal intuitions. The latter theories may recognize a variety of additional constants as needed in order to formalize a given set of intuitions. (shrink)

"theaetetus" of the thesis that knowledge is sense-perception. After a brief defence of plato's handling of this thesis it is shown how the argument can, by the addition of one premiss, be rendered valid. A strong form of the 'proper objects' doctrine of perception is revealed as a crucial premiss. An implication of the argument is seen to be that perception in itself is unable to found an ordered and coherent picture of the world. A similar point, it is argued, (...) lies behind certain passages in the central books of the "republic". A tentative conclusion is that in the "theaetetus" plato retains and indeed sharpens the views about the sensible world which he expresses in the "republic". (shrink)

Julio A Andrade African Journal of Business Ethics 2013 7(1):40-42.

This thoughtful reflection on a valuable questionnaire survey of patients' attitudes regarding being told that their dentist had been infected with hepatitis B is of very direct relevance to HIV, as the authors show.1 The measured tone and analytical approach are a welcome change from the stridency that has characterised some of the debate elsewhere. I am very conscious that more time and effort has gone into drafting and redrafting, amending, revising and refining policy in this area than in any (...) other area of HIV control, with the probable exception of blood transfusion. Yet this is the setting that has the lowest risk among all established routes. Why has it been so hard to establish a satisfactory policy and practice to deal with this situation?Many factors, of course, apply. However, much seems to stem from a prevailing view, fostered by recent political administrations, that health care can be delivered in a risk-free way. This has also been linked with a “blame culture”, where adverse outcomes are seen as someone's fault, and where the professions are regarded with distrust. It has been fuelled by levels of concern about risk for HIV that have stemmed more from media “stories” about risk than careful risk assessment.Hence Blatchford et al comment that public anxiety about HIV relative to hepatitis B was a factor in assessing how the incident was handled, implying that HIV was of greater concern - even though the risk of transmission is some two orders of magnitude less. Interestingly, they also comment that, because the risk of death with HIV is higher than for hepatitis B, this balances the overall risk. I am not sure of the validity of this argument, …. (shrink)

This is a summary of “Toward a Global Media Ethics: Theoretical Perspectives,” which appeared in Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies , 29(2), 2008, 135-172. The article was written by Clifford G. Christians, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Shakuntala Rao, State University of New York-Plattsburgh; Stephen J. A. Ward, University of Wisconsin-Madison; and Herman Wasserman, University of Sheffield. It was the result of a workshop on global media ethics by the article's authors hosted by the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS) (...) at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. The authors brought to the discussion the different perspectives of contractualism, communitarianism, and critical theory. The intention of the summary is to the draw the attention of scholars and ethicists outside the readership of Ecquid Novi to this leading-edge theoretical work. It is hoped the summary will stimulate comment and further work in global media ethics. The summary is not intended to replace the original article. Readers should consult the original for the full argument. (shrink)

Im Jahrgang LXV der Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales wurde die Reihe «Entretiens» inauguriert, in der angesehene Forscher auf dem Gebiet der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie zu ihrem persönlichen Werdegang als Forscher, zu ihren Forschungsschwerpunkten und zur Zukunft der Mittelalterforschung Auskunft geben. Das zweite Interview führten Jan A. Aertsen und Andreas Speer mit Wolfgang Kluxen, emeritierter Ordinarius für Philosophie in Bonn, von 1972 bis 1982 Präsident, später président d’honneur der Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale.

Philosophical traditions often bear the seeds of their own destruction.Their seminal insights are achieved in part by ignoring or distorting certain aspects of human experience. Insights and mistakes grow from the same roots. In transitional periods, this dialectic leads to strange reversals in allegiance and to unexpected and even unnoticed shifts in philosophical doctrine. Classical empiricism presents an example of this when one shifts attention from its treatment of epistemological questions to problems of humanaction, or to the relation of knowledge (...) and action. The empiricist analysisof knowledge in terms of the succession and conjoining of ideas and impressions in the mind leaves the mind itself a passive spectator that undergoes its contents. On this view, the human subject lacks any distinctive spontaneity or power of initiative. The mind's internal processes are conceived ofon analogy with Newtonian mechanics and are distinguished by their law-likeregularity. The subject is not, and cannot conceive itself as being, a kindof agency. Historically, the consequences of this are evident in Berkeley's difficulties regarding ‘active spirit’, of which we have ‘notions’ but not perceptions, and in the often remarked upon disparities between Parts I and III of Hume's Treatise. (shrink)

In this note I construct a proper o-minimal expansion of the ordered additive group of rationals.

The ‘beautiful axiom’ to which Dickens refers is a central feature of Thomas Hobbes' thinking but its precise role in his moral philosophy remains unclear. I shall here attempt both to dispel the unclarity and to evaluate the adequacy of the position that emerges. Given the high level of contemporary interest in Hobbes' thought, both within and beyond philosophical circles, this is an enterprise of considerable importance. None the less, my interest is not merely interpretative, since the assessment of Hobbes' (...) attitude to ‘the beautiful axiom’ raises important and difficult questions about what might be termed the preconditions of morality. (shrink)

Peter Geach supports his case that the religion of Thomas Hobbes was both genuine and a version of Socinianism principally by comparing the theological and scriptural sections of Leviathan with the main doctrines of Socinianism and its latter-day developments in Unitarianism and Christadelphianism. He pays particular attention to comparisons with the Racovian Catechism, the theological writings of Joseph Priestley and the Christadelphian document Christendom Astray by Robert Roberts.

Finitary sketches, i.e., sketches with finite-limit and finite-colimit specifications, are proved to be as strong as geometric sketches, i.e., sketches with finite-limit and arbitrary colimit specifications. Categories sketchable by such sketches are fully characterized in the infinitary first-order logic: they are axiomatizable by σ-coherent theories, i.e., basic theories using finite conjunctions, countable disjunctions, and finite quantifications. The latter result is absolute; the equivalence of geometric and finitary sketches requires (in fact, is equivalent to) the non-existence of measurable cardinals.